Non-Bank Financial Institutions: Regulation For Development

USAID SEGIR Annual Meeting

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
Overview

- Why are NBFIs Important?
- Where are they in development?
- Assumptions for NBFI Regulation
- Framework for Supervision
- Lessons Learned
- Mauritius Regulation for Development

Why Are NBFI's Important?


NBFI's	Role in financial sector	
Insurance (Life and	- Household Stability	
General)	Savings Mobilization	
	Transfer Risk - Support Trade/Commerce	
Mutual/Pension Funds	- Savings Mobilization	
	Resource Allocation	
	- Add Depth/Liquidity to Financial Mkts	
Securities Markets		
	- Alternative Intermediation	
	Spur Competition	
Brokers/Dealers	 Savings Mobilization 	
	Execute Transactions	
	■ Market Make	
Credit Coops/Finance	- Add Liquidity	
Cos/Leasing		
	Alternative Sources of Finance	
	Under-served Niches/Areas	
	Broaden Financial Markets	

Financial Intermediation at 10,000 ft.





Relative Position of NBFIs Around the World

Role/importance of banks diminish somewhat as economies grow



Penetration of Insurance and Contractual Savings





Development Factors

Varied, inter-dependent, and different than for banks

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NBFI's	Development Factors
Insurance (Life and General)	 Savings, mkt depth, inflation, other vehicles Urbanization, family structure, religion, savings culture Tax policy, pension policies
Mutual/Pension Funds	 Existence of govt pension/safety nets, depth of stock market Market integrity Tax incentives
Securities Markets Brokers/Dealers	 Depository, trading system, clearing/settlment Disclosure, conduct of business, clear mandate Institutional investors
Credit Coops/Finance Cos/ Leasing	 Sources of wholesale finance Market-oriented legal framework, regulatory gaps Reach of banking system

Some Differences Among Regions

- Bank-based systems
- Weak legacy of NBFI services
- Some growth, but slow development

- Strong (arbitrage) growth, but under-regulated.
- Contributed to crises in Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, Japan

- NBFIs evolved to fill gaps in bank-based systems (inflation and reach)
- Legacy of stateownership
- Systemic underdevelopment



Development can go wrong ...

Thailand	 Systemic risk from finance companies were catalysts of crises.
Singapore	 Barings collapse from unauthorized trading by subsidiary.
Japan	Strain on banking system from finance company subsidiaries.
Korea	 Merchant banks and trust funs as secondary banks Leasing and life insurance as secondary banking systems
Brazil/Phillipines	Pre-need institutions go unregulated yet extend commitments many years into future.
United States	LTCM collapse over derivatives leverage rocked the financial system for days.
Albania	Failed pyramid schemes put country in crises

Regulatory Issues

- Historically, no coherent approach to NBFI regulation (different roles; different risks; different perceptions; patchwork evolution)
- Regulation towards application of individual laws created in a policy/sector strategy vacuum.
- Capacity-building reform around skill-building, organizational design and standards implementation.
- Enforcement mechanisms weak and inflexible
- NBFI development sensitive to regulation burden vs. efficiency
- Role in money laundering under scrutiny ... these days

Question: How should NBFIs be regulated for efficiency and development

Important Assumptions for NBFI Regulation Design

- Neutrality in regulation among financial intermediaries is key to avoid unsound/fettered development.
- Not all institutions need to be regulated alike: differentiation of risks and policies.
- Intensity of supervision should be scaled by the degree of risk - proportionality
- Coordination of regulation towards different objectives – i.e. for safety and soundness, market conduct, and consumer protection
- The incentives have to be in line.
- Effective regulation is holistic.
- Regulation should not seek to avoid all failure – tolerance limits driven by policy

Integrated Framework for Regulation

Set Objectives

Design Tools


Apply Regulation

Objectives (Indicative)

- **✓ Safety and Soundness**
- **✓ Market Integrity**
- **✓ Protect Users of Fin Svcs**
- **✓ Other Policy Decisions**


Principles

- **✓** Neutrality
- **✓** Proportionality
- **✓** Cost Effective
- **✓Leverage Mkt Discipline**
- **✓** Leverage Self-Regulation




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Calibrating Supervision



Calibrated Supervision (Indicative)



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Organization for Regulation

- Institutional
- Functional
- Inegrated

Organizational Designs around the World

Brazil
Argentina
Chile
Venezuela
Mexico
Spain
Peru
Begium
Denmark
Germany
France
<i>Ireland</i>
Netherland
Austria
Sweden
United Kingdom
Switzerland
ChezkRepublic
Hungary
Poland
Slovenia
United states
Japan

Banking	Securities	Insurance		
СВ	CB/S	1		
В	S	i i		
В	SI			
В	S	1		
BS I				
СВ	S	i		
BI	S	ВІ		
5.	BS	1		
SSA				
В	S	I		
B/CB	S	1		
СВ	S	G		
СВ	S	ī		
G	G	G		
SSA				
SSA		ı		
BS		1		
СВ	SI			
В	SI			
СВ	S	I		
СВ	S	G		
СВ	S	1		
SSA				

BS = Banking and Securities Supevisor

CB = Central Bank

SSA = Single Financial Supervisory Authority

B = Specialized Banking Supervisor

 $\mathsf{BI} = \mathsf{Banking}$ and Insurance Supervisor

S = Specialized Securities Supervisor

I = Specialized Insurance Supervisor

G = Government Department

SI = Securities and Insurance Supervisor

Implementing TA: Lessons from Practice

- Policy coherency
- Address root causes
- Consensus build (industry consulation, MOU, stakeholder map)
- Develop a rigorous (sound policy-based) framework for sequencing
- Train don't just educate
- Build in more routine assessment of progress
- Engage counterparts from Day One
- Be Activist
- Tailor the approach one size does not fit all

Implementing TA: Discernable Needs of Donor Countriesc

- Policy setting and objective setting advisory sorting through the issues
- Developing coherent frameworks for regulation
- Best Practice Standards for Integrated NBFI Regulation
- Policy frameworks for harmonization of NBFI regulations
- Public consultation processes
- Development of supervisory cooperation agreements
- Training in the application of regulation
- Enforcement, enforcement, enforcement

Case of Mauritius

Creation of an integrated NBFI regulator

Broaden economic base in FS to serve region

Fill regulatory gaps in NBFI sector

Fill regulatory gaps in offshore industry

Harmonize regulatory process among banks and NBFIs

Develop FS promotio agency

Regulatory Structure for Financial Sector

FSD Act



Program Phases

Coordination

Insurance Commissioner

SEC

Unregulated NBFIs

Offshore

- Policy Frameworks
- Best Practice Laws/Regs
- Public Consultations
- Gap Filling
- Fundamentals
- Skill Development

Integration

BoM

FSC

BoM

Harmonization

FSC

- Structured risk assessment methodologies
- Differentiated supervision
- Risk-focused orientation
- Enforcement breadth

- Advanced risk-based
- Harmonization with banks
- Conglomerates
- Complex investments
- E-banking and electronic commerce

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Some Indicative Experience

- UK (BoE)
- Macedonia
- Romania

- Korea
- China (PBOC)
- Indonesia
- Thailand
- Hong Kong

Touche

- Canada (CDIC)
- US (various)
- Jamaica (Integration)
- Argentina (Resolution)
- Ecuador (Dep Insurand
- Brazil (Central Bank)

- Uganda (Pensions)
- Mauritius

